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Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case of
US Subprime Lenders
Maureen I. Muller-Kahle* and Krista B. Lewellyn
ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: The origins of the global financial crisis have been attributed to the combination of a housing
price bubble and innovative financial instruments, as well as the lack of restraint by corporate executives and boards to
engage in excessive risk-taking. The rise in subprime lending between 1997 and 2005 played a crucial role in inflating the
housing price bubble. We take a unique dataset of US financial institutions heavily engaged in subprime lending and ask the
following research question: Did board configuration play a role in determining whether a financial institution specialized
in subprime lending?
Research Findings/Insights: We use a matched-pair sample of firms in the financial industry from 1997–2005 with half of
the sample specializing in subprime lending and conduct panel data logistic regression analysis. We find that the board
configurations of those financial institutions that engaged in subprime lending were significantly different from those that
did not. Specifically, subprime lenders had boards that were busier, had less tenure, and were less diverse with respect to
gender.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study uses the group decision making perspective in the context of subprime
lending to examine board of director configuration and its influence on decision making processes around the issue of risky
subprime lending. Findings show that how boards were configured did influence the decision to specialize in subprime
lending. We find robust support for predictions based on the group decision making perspective.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The deterioration of mortgage lending requirements that gave rise to the defaults of so
many subprime loans, in retrospect, appears to be something that should have been entirely preventable. By demonstrating
that subprime specialists had significant differences in board configuration that impacted group decision making, this study
offers guidance to policymakers considering additional regulation and for corporate officers examining corporate gover-
nance issues.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Subprime Lending, Group Decision Making, Board of Directors, Board Busyness,
Board Gender Diversity, Board Tenure
“W e almost invariably spent more time living with theconsequences of our decisions than we do in
making them” (Pfeffer, 1972:19). Group decision making has
been studied in the context of both top management teams
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) and the board of directors
(Amason, 1996; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Scholars have
examined decision speed (Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge & Miller,
1991), decision quality (Amason, 1996; Atkinson & Atkinson,
2006; Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Schweiger, Sandberg, &
Ragan, 1986; Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003), decision accuracy
(Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major, & Philips, 1995),
and decision processes (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, &
Schulz-Hardt, 2007) in the context of top management teams
and boards of directors.
Others have studied the dynamics of group decision
making within the board of directors and identified several
challenges confronting boards as they strive to be involved
in the strategic decision making process. Bainbridge (2002)
suggests that social loafing, where some members choose
not to actively participate in board decision making, and
herd-type behavior where a decision maker “imitates the
actions of others while ignoring his/[her] own information
and judgment with regard to the merits of the underlying
decision” can both be problematic issues that arise as boards
seek to be involved in strategic decision making (Bainbridge,
2002:28). Groupthink has also been cited as a problem where
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too much group cohesiveness can lead to diminished critical
thinking (Janis, 1983). More recently, Westphal and Bednar
(2005) find that pluralistic ignorance can occur in boards,
meaning board members fail to express concerns about cor-
porate strategy based on others not expressing concern.
With the possibility of these numerous issues that can
arise in group decision making, are there ways to structure
the board of directors to increase the likelihood of effective
group decision making? We suggest the recent context of the
subprime mortgage industry provides a unique research
setting to study board of director configuration and its
impact on board decision making. Many argue for the need
to move away from studies of board demography or board
characteristics to a more holistic approach (Johnson, Daily, &
Ellstrand, 1996; Kim, Burns, & Prescott, 2009; Pettigrew,
1992. Ingley and van der Walt (2003) use the term board
configuration when examining how board structure can
improve decision making effectiveness.
Many point to subprime mortgage defaults in the United
States as being the key trigger to the global financial crisis
that began in 2007 (Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010).
Subprime loans are defined as “loans granted to borrowers
with low credit ratings” (Piskorski, Seru, & Vig, 2010:370).
Recent reports estimate that 3.6 million homeowners in the
US will have to foreclose on their homes because they are
unable to meet their loan obligations (Simon, 2010). As of
2008, US financial institutions are facing estimated losses of
up to $300 billion as a result of their subprime lending
(Sherman & Tana, 2008). The collapse of the subprime
market and the subsequent financial shock that rippled
across global markets can be attributed to a combination of
factors, but has its roots in risky US mortgage lending prac-
tices (Wolf, 2010). Clearly, if the global financial crisis can be
compared to an earthquake, subprime lending is at the
epicenter.
In this paper, we examine the impact of the board of
director configuration on the decision making abilities of the
board of directors in the context of the US subprime industry
by asking the following research question: Did board of
director configuration limit the decision making abilities of
financial institutions and lead certain firms to heavy involve-
ment in subprime lending? Using the group decision
making perspective to guide our analysis, we argue that
some firms had board configurations which led to inferior
group decision making processes leading firms to specialize
in risky subprime lending, which not only adversely
impacted firm performance, but, on a mass scale, contrib-
uted to the global financial crisis. We use a unique dataset of
firms identified by the US Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) as specializing in subprime lending and compare
their corporate governance mechanisms to a matched pair
sample of non-subprime specialist firms to test a theoretical
framework underpinned by group decision making theory.
In doing so, we seek to contribute to corporate governance
literature and, in particular, add to the knowledge about the
strategic decision making role of boards.
This paper adds to the corporate governance literature by
considering how certain attributes of boards impact their
effectiveness in firm decision making. In addition, it furthers
understanding of antecedents leading to the global financial
crisis. The assumption that a firm’s board of directors con-
stitutes a group responsible for monitoring firm level stra-
tegic decisions (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) guides our
examination of how board configuration impacted the deci-
sion to specialize in subprime lending. In the next section,
we develop the theoretical framework underpinning our
study, including a discussion of the rationale for using the
subprime lending context and the group decision making
perspective. Following the development of testable hypoth-
eses, we discuss the methodology employed, and the results
from our analysis. We conclude with a discussion of the
findings including theoretical and managerial implications.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Subprime Lending Context
Kranacher (2008) provides an excellent summary of the
subprime mortgage loan process. First, individuals were
able to acquire loans with poor credit and little to no income
verification. Second, mortgage lenders used introductory
“teaser” rates to qualify borrowers. Third, loans were then
re-packaged and sold into collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) and sold to other investors. Investors were unable to
gauge the riskiness of these loans. Fourth, CDOs were then
packaged into loan groupings on the basis of risk level,
labeled by credit rating agencies as AAA to A for the best
group, BBB to B for the middle group, and the riskiest were
not rated or covered by bond insurance. Fifth, many of these
CDOs were transferred to off-balance sheet special purpose
vehicles and held by banks. When homeowners with poor
credit and increasing payments began to foreclose, the riski-
est CDOs were not insured and the remaining CDOs were
inadequately covered by underfunded bond insurance
which in turn led to huge losses and dramatic failures of
many financial institutions and a worldwide global financial
crisis.
Given the colossal failures of firms such as Enron, World-
com, and Tyco in the early 2000s and now, with the global
financial crisis, the topic of corporate governance continues
to garner much attention. Solomon (2007:14) defines corpo-
rate governance as “the system of checks and balances, both
internal and external to companies, which ensures that com-
panies discharge their accountability to all their sharehold-
ers and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their
business activity.” Firms are governed by both internal and
external governance mechanisms (Denis & McConnell,
2003). Internal governance mechanisms include such things
as the board of directors and the ownership structure of the
firm, while external governance mechanisms include the
market for corporate control and the pertinent legal system.
Agency theory has been the dominant theoretical perspec-
tive used in research on boards (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, &
Dalton, 2007; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). The central
tenet of agency theory is an overarching concern about the
divergence of interests between principals and agents (Berle
& Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Berle and Means
(1932) trace the growth of the American corporation from a
single proprietorship to a public corporation and suggest
that this new structure was likely to give rise to problems of
ownership and control. As a result, there is the fear that
managers may be acting in their own self-interest instead of
406 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Volume 19 Number 5 September 2011 © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
the interests of the corporation. In other words, opportunis-
tic managerial decision-making could adversely impact
company performance. This gave rise to agency theory that
was further enhanced by the work of Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) who posit that managers
may misuse corporate assets for their own personal benefit
and at the expense of shareholders. Thus, agency costs can
diminish corporate performance.
A core agency theory premise is that boards are config-
ured to monitor company executives and protect share-
holder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Monitoring activities
include hiring and firing top managers (Johnson et al., 1996),
assessing and rewarding top management performance,
ratifying managerial decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Rosen-
stein & Wyatt, 1997), and overseeing strategic initiatives
(Rindova, 1999). However, many studies including recent
meta-analyses show equivocal results when examining rela-
tionships between firm performance and agency variables
such as board independence, CEO duality, and board size
(Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Researchers are
beginning to explore drivers and implications of board
behavioral dynamics (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Payne,
Benson, & Finegold, 2009; Ruigrok, Peck, & Keller, 2006)
specifically from a group dynamics perspective. This study
aims to contribute to this research.
Group Decision Making Perspective
The study of group decision making has its roots in the field
of psychology via cognitive theories, but has been also
studied by management researchers. Cutting and Kouzmin
(2002:28) define a decision as a “judgement, assessment, or
cognitive commitment to a particular knowing.” Blinder and
Morgan (2005) find that groups make better decisions than
individuals. Boards are not only decision-making groups
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999) but are also the “apex of the firm’s
decision control system” (Fama & Jensen, 1983:311). Boards
are unique work groups who meet on average only seven
times per year (Monks & Minow, 1995).
We build on Forbes and Milliken (1999) who identify three
key components of board effectiveness: the presence and
usage of knowledge and skills, effort, and cognitive conflict.
We posit that these components are linked to how long
directors have served on the board, how overcommitted they
are to other entities, and whether the board has gender
diversity and in turn how these board configurations impact
board decision making effectiveness.
Usage of Knowledge and Skills and Board Tenure.
Forbes and Milliken (1999:495) define use of knowledge and
skills as “the board’s ability to tap the knowledge and skills
available to it and then apply them to its task.” We argue that
boards with low tenure lack internal knowledge of firm and
industry specific issues and thus, are not as effective in
decision making as boards with greater tenure. Boards with
directors that have less tenure have also been deemed inef-
fective, as a result of their inability to effectively challenge
management (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Three studies exam-
ining the relationship between board tenure and financial
fraud found that boards with low tenure were more likely to
engage in fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley, 1996;
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Dunn, 2004). These studies
suggest that at low levels of tenure, boards are more likely to
acquiesce to management, putting a hold on expressing
opinions and questioning management until they are more
familiar with company and its operations. In the context of
the current study, at low levels of tenure, boards may be less
likely to questions management’s decision to specialize in
subprime lending. Defined as “the fruits of an organiza-
tion’s experience” (Rothwell & Poduch, 2004:406), institu-
tional memory is important as it leads to higher quality
output (Bainbridge, 2002). When boards have low tenure,
they may lack necessary skills and knowledge due to low
levels of institutional memory. Thus, we predict a negative
relationship between board of director tenure and subprime
lending, leading to our first hypothesis:
H1. Board of director tenure will be negatively associated with
subprime lending.
Effort and Board Busyness. Forbes and Milliken (1999)
argue that effort level is another important determinant of
effective group decision making. Effort is defined as the
level of energy a member devotes to a task (Wageman, 1995).
Effort levels can be influenced by group norms (Feldman,
1984; Steiner, 1972). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that
decision quality can suffer due to the lack of time directors
have to devote to board duties. Others argue that many
directors do not put significant effort into their board duties
and are not fully engaged with their board duties (Herman,
1981; Mace, 1986).
Thus, we posit that effort levels by board members are
diminished when directors serve on multiple boards. Mul-
tiple board appointments can adversely affect a board’s
decision-making effectiveness as directors are overcommit-
ted and inattentive. Furthermore, two groups, the National
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) and the Council
of Institutional Investors (CII), have recommended placing
limits on the number of board appointments an individual
should accept. NACD suggests that individuals holding
senior corporate executive positions should accept no more
than three board appointments, while the CII recommends
that individuals holding full-time jobs be limited to no more
than two board appointments.
There is empirical evidence to suggest that busy boards
have an adverse impact on firms. Core, Holthausen, and
Larcker (1999) find a positive relationship between director
busyness and excessive CEO compensation. Others find a
negative relationship between number of outside board
seats and firm performance. For example, Fich and Shiv-
dasani (2006) find that firms with a majority of outside direc-
tors holding more board seats have a 4.2 per cent lower book
to market ratio, lower operating ROA, lower asset turnover
ratios, and lower operating return on sales. They also point
out methodological problems of noisy data that does not
distinguish between inside and outside director busyness in
the Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) study which
finds a positive relationship between busy boards and firm
performance. Jackling and Johl (2009) also find a negative
relationship between multiple directorships and firm perfor-
mance in a sample of Indian firms. Finally, Jiraporn, Singh,
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and Lee (2009) find that firms with multiple directorships
tend to be more diversified and are more likely to suffer
from diversification discounting (Denis, Denis, & Yost,
2002).
We posit that a firm’s decision to heavily engage in
subprime lending may have arisen from the board being busy
with the affairs of other entities, thus lacking time and moti-
vation to put in the effort required to provide meaningful and
adequate strategic guidance. Thus, firms with busy boards
are more likely to suffer from ineffective group decision
making that could lead to financial firms choosing to take part
in subprime lending. Thus, the next hypothesis is offered.
H2. The level of outside director busyness is positively associ-
ated with subprime lending.
Cognitive Conflict and Gender Diversity. The third
component of Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) model is the
need for cognitive conflict in group decision making. Cog-
nitive conflict is defined as “task-oriented differences in
judgment among group members” (Forbes & Milliken,
1999:494). Cognitive conflict can be beneficial to boards for
several reasons. First, when there is lack of cognitive conflict,
groupthink can occur (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998) and deci-
sion quality suffers. Second, when board members disagree
on an issue, additional discussion about an issue is required
and the CEO is forced to allocate additional time and effort
to alleviate concerns and possibly introduce new strategic
options (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Third, others find that
diversity within the decision making group can improve
decision making quality due to group members having dif-
ferent educational, functional and industry backgrounds
(Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). Ancona and Caldwell (1992)
find that diverse groups have higher levels of cognitive con-
flict because group members bring many different types of
information into group discussions.
We examine cognitive conflict with respect to gender
diversity for several reasons. First, reports suggest that only
15 per cent of Fortune 500 boards have a woman on the board
(Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008). Miller and del
Carmen Triana (2009) note that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 mandated increased independence of boards opening
up many new opportunities for women to join boards. With
more women climbing the corporate ladder, it is important
to address the issue of board gender diversity. Indeed, others
have called for increases in research on the impact of board
gender diversity (Bilimoria & Wheeler, 2000; Burke, 2000).
Diversity “relates to board composition and the varied
combination of attributes, characteristics, and expertise con-
tributed by individual board members in relation to board
process and decision-making” (Van der Walt & Ingley,
2003:219). Prior conceptual and empirical research suggests
that board of director diversity is beneficial to the firm. First,
board diversity is thought to increase legitimacy among
stakeholders (Ray, 2005) and lead to better stakeholder rela-
tionships (Tyson, 2003). Second, diverse boards show the
benefits of cognitive conflict as they foster more effective
strategic decision making (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988;
Schweiger et al., 1986) and increase the likelihood of needed
strategic change (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Goodstein,
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994).
Other ways gender diversity on the board can potentially
improve corporate governance are by providing a larger
assortment of perspectives for assessing managerial deci-
sions and actions as well as providing increased levels of
information search (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007).
Several studies report that boards containing women are
more civilized and sensitive (Bilimoria, 2000). Research also
suggests that women are more collaborative (Konrad,
Kramer, & Erkut, 2008).
Increased diversity of skills, experiences, and back-
grounds are more likely to raise questions that add to, rather
than simply echo, the voice of management” (Selby,
2000:239). Women are not part of the “old boys’ network”
and thus, can be considered to be more independent than
male board members (Brennan & McCafferty, 1997).
Increased independence translates into increased heteroge-
neity of ideas leading to higher quality decisions (Amason,
1996). Many studies have found a positive impact of board
gender diversity on firm performance (Bernardi, Bean, and
Weippert, 2002; Burke, 2000; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson,
2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). Recently, Nielsen
and Huse (2010) found that boards with gender diversity led
to increased board strategic control.
Using the group decision making perspective, we argue
that board gender diversity encourages cognitive conflict
which leads to more effective decision making within the
firm and, thus, firms with gender diversity will be less likely
to engage in subprime lending. More formally stated:
H3. Gender diversity of the board of directors is negatively
associated with subprime lending.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data
The sample used in this study consists of 74 US based pub-
licly traded firms in the financial industry in 13 SIC codes
ranging from 6,021 to 6,798 over the period from 1997–2005.
The data is sourced from US Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), Thomson One Financial, and
DEF14A Proxy statements filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Thirty-seven of the 74 firms are designated as subprime
specialists by HUD, which created and maintained a data-
base of financial institutions that were heavily engaged in
subprime lending from 1993–2005. The database contained
485 publicly and privately held companies that were
heavily involved in subprime lending any time from 1993–
2005. HUD ceased updating their database after 2005.
Subprime lenders were identified by HUD using a two-
step process. First, HUD used three indicators to narrow
the list of lenders who specialized in subprime – origina-
tion rates, resale of portfolios, and rate spreads. From
there, these lenders were either called or their web pages
were visited by HUD staff to verify their subprime status.
A lender was identified by HUD as being a subprime spe-
cialist if over 50 per cent of their lending portfolio con-
sisted of subprime loans (HUD, 2010).
As subprime lending was so limited in the early years, we
chose to look at data from 1997 to 2005. Chomsisengphet and
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Pennington-Cross (2006) report that subprime lending grew
from a $65 billion business in 1995 to a $332 billion business
in 2003. As our research objective was to study the subprime
industry as a catalyst of the global financial crisis, we felt it
prudent to start our sampling in 1997.
Of the 485 companies in the HUD database, 438 were
privately held leaving 47 publicly held firms. Next, we uti-
lized Thomson One Financial to acquire financial data. Gov-
ernance data was then hand collected from SEC DEF 14A
proxy statements. There were no proxy statements for 10 of
the firms, leaving a final sample of 37 firms specializing in
subprime lending over 1997–2005. The mean number of
years that the firms in the sample appeared on the HUD
subprime list is 4.4, with a range from one to nine years.
From inspection of the data, there was no incidence of a firm
appearing and reappearing on the subprime specialist list.
In summary, the total firm years for the subprime specialist
firms are 172.
We then obtained a matched pair of companies that did
not specialize in subprime lending. We matched firm size
(via total assets) and industry (to a four digit SIC) for the
first year that the firm appeared in the study. For example,
if the first year of the sample firm was 1997, then we found
a corresponding firm in the same four-digit SIC that was
within 10 per cent of total assets in 1997 and never subse-
quently on the subprime specialist list. If the firm had data
for the full nine years of the sample, we used the same
control firm throughout the time frame. If the first year
that firm appeared on the subprime list was 2003, we then
found a control firm that matched asset size and SIC in
2003. Thus, our final sample consists of 74 firms and 344
firm years. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the full sample
by year.
All financial data was sourced from Thomson One Finan-
cial. Governance and ownership data was hand collected
from proxy statements (Schedule DEF14A reports) filed
with the SEC. Compact Disclosure was also used to source
of some of the ownership data that was missing in the
Schedule DEF14A. Due to missing observations on some
variables, the final sample consists of 275 observations over
1997–2005.
Measures
Dependent Variable. For this study, we utilize one
dependent variable, Subprime. Subprime is a dichotomous
variable which takes a value of 1 if the firm is on the HUD
Subprime Specialist List and 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables. Endogeneity, or reverse causal-
ity is less plausible, given our research design. In our empiri-
cal tests, all of our independent variables are collected in the
year preceding the firm identified on the subprime list. Thus,
measures for our explanatory in the earlier period could not
have resulted from identified as a subprime specialist in the
subsequent period.
Our key explanatory variables are board of director tenure,
outside director busyness, and board gender diversity. We follow
Dunn (2004) and measure board of director tenure as the total
number of years served on the board by each director
divided by the total number of directors. Data on board of
director tenure was sourced from firm proxy statements.
Outside director busyness refers to the number of outside
board seats each outside director holds divided by the
number of outside directors. Board of director busyness has
been measured several different ways. Jiraporn et al. (2009)
measure the total number of outside directorships held by
both inside and outside directors. Ferris et al. (2003) used
four different measures for board busyness: (1) average
number of director positions held by all the directors; (2) the
maximum number of director positions held; (3) the per-
centage of directors that held three or more outside director
positions; and (4) the average number of outside director
positions held by outside board members. Fich and Shiv-
dasani (2006) criticize the operationalization of the Ferris et
al. (2003) study suggesting that their measures are noisy,
suggesting that the data does not distinguish between inside
and outside director busyness. Instead, they define a board
as busy if a majority of the outside directors have three or
more board positions.
Finally, Jackling and Johl (2009) use two measures of board
busyness. The first measure of board busyness is the average
number of directorships held by both inside and outside
directors of a firm. The second measure is the average
number of director positions held by outside directors of the
firm. As this study is indirectly examining the monitoring
capabilities of outside board members, the second Jackling
and Johl (2009) measure is used. Thus, outside director busy-
ness is measured as the average number of director positions
held by outside directors of the firm and was sourced from
proxy statements.
We follow Miller and del Carmen Triana (2009) and
measure board gender diversity as the proportion of women to
total directors and the data was also sourced from proxy
statements.
Control Variables. Our model includes three types of
control variables to capture the impact of variables that may
influence group decision making dynamics: board, CEO,
and firm related characteristics. As with the independent
variables, all control variables are lagged one year. First, we
control for other governance variables such as board size,
board independence, and staggered board. Board size is
TABLE 1
Full Sample Total Sample Break-Down by Year
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative
1997 38 11.05 11.05
1998 44 12.79 23.84
1999 48 13.95 37.79
2000 46 13.37 51.16
2001 42 12.21 63.37
2002 34 9.88 73.26
2003 34 9.88 83.14
2004 28 8.14 91.28
2005 30 8.72 100.00
Total 344 100.00
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included as a control variable as it has been shown to have
some impact on group decision making. Some suggest that
large boards can bring additional perspective to discussions;
however, large boards can also contribute to social loafing
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Additionally, Judge and Zeithaml
(1992) found that the board size is negatively related to stra-
tegic decision making. Board size is defined as the total
number of members that are on the board of directors
(Judge, Gaur, & Muller-Kahle, 2010). Data on board size is
sourced from proxy statements. We also examine the impact
of board independence on the decision to engage in
subprime lending. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) argue
that board members differ in their access to information
which could have an impact decision making. They argue
that inside board members have greater access to informa-
tion that outside board members who are not as knowledge-
able about the day to day affairs of the company and must
rely on the information presented by the CEO. Thus, we
include board independence as a control variable. We mea-
sured board independence as the ratio of independent direc-
tors to total directors. Next, we control for staggered boards
as this could have some impact on board decision making.
Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) find that firms
with staggered boards are less likely to accept a hostile offer
bid even though it could be to detriment of the shareholders.
We follow Pathan (2009) and create a dummy variable for
staggered board which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s entire
board is not up for re-election at the same time and 0 if it is
a unitary board with all members standing for election each
year.
Second, we control for CEO characteristics by controlling
for CEO duality, CEO tenure, and CEO ownership. Cutting
and Kouzmin (2002) argue that when the CEO performs
the dual role of chairperson on the board, the concentration
of power can cause dialogue and discussion to diminish
and potentially impact board decision making. Further-
more, Westphal and Zajac (1995) suggest that a CEO who
is also the chairperson of the board may be more likely to
select board members who will not challenge him/her.
Following Boyd (1995), a dummy variable for CEO duality
is created by coding 0 for separated CEO and chair roles,
and 1 for a combined CEO/chair role. CEO duality data is
also sourced from proxy statements. As CEOs gain tenure,
they are more likely to establish bonds with the board of
directors, become more entrenched, and receive less scru-
tiny (O’Sullivan, 1999). Miller (1991) shows that long
tenured CEOs avoid making strategic changes. Similarly,
top management team research shows that top manage-
ment teams are less likely to make large strategic changes
as their tenure increases (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990;
Grimm & Smith, 1991; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992); thus,
CEO tenure may impact board of director making. We
define CEO tenure as the total number of years that person
has been in the CEO role.
As CEO ownership increases, scholars have found that
CEO have their personal wealth at stake and are more likely
to utilize the board in an advisory capacity (Beatty & Zajac,
1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995). Following Zhou (2001), we
define CEO ownership as the total number of shares held by
the CEO divided by the firm’s total number of outstanding
shares.
The last three control variables are used to control for firm
related effects–firm age, firm size, and debt to equity. The age of
the firm could have some impact on group decision making
within boards as younger firms may be under greater pres-
sure to involve boards in key decisions (Judge & Zeithaml,
1992). Furthermore, Mishra, Randøy, and Jenssen (2001)
determined that firm age is an important determinant for
business characteristics and company goals. Firm age is cal-
culated by the total number of years since incorporation and
is calculated by the difference between the subprime year
and the firm’s year of incorporation lagged one year. Firm
age data is sourced from Thomson One. We include firm size
as a control variable as it has been shown to have some
impact on group decision making in boards. Finkelstein and
Hambrick (1996) find that boards in smaller firms have more
input in decision making. Firm size is measured by the book
value of total assets (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that firm managers may prefer to use
debt financing instead of equity as a strategy to avoid scru-
tiny by shareholders, lessen the monitoring by the board,
which could impact board decision making. Thus, we use a
control variable, debt-to-equity, which is defined as total debt
divided by total assets.
Methods
Since our dependent variable, subprime specialist, is dichoto-
mous in nature, we utilize a binary logistic regression
model. Moreover, as our sample is longitudinal, we use a
panel logistic regression to test our hypotheses as this
method enables us to account for within firm correlation in
the error terms. We use a random effects model for several
reasons. First, our sample is made up of an unbalanced panel
as not every firm appears for the full nine years of the
sample. Second, we used random effects estimation, since
fixed-effects estimation requires significant within panel
(financial firm) variation of the variables to produce efficient
estimates (Zhou, 2001). Many of the independent variables,
such as board independence and ownership structure are
stable over time, within firm variation for these variables is
minimal. Also, since firms were only listed as a subprime
specialist if they were on the HUD list there are many years
where a firm is not listed at all, and with a fixed effects
model, these firms would be dropped, making the applica-
bility of this procedure inappropriate for the analysis.
RESULTS
Correlations
All variables were tested for normality using the STATA 10.0
Skewness-Kurtosis test (sktest) and all variables are found to
be normally distributed. Next, correlations and descriptive
statistics for all the variables included in the study are pre-
sented in Table 2. There seems to be no major problems with
multi-collinearity as all correlations are under .58. To be
sure, all independent variables were checked for multi-
collinearity via analysis of variance inflation factors (VIF)
and results also reported in Table 2. All independent and
control variables have variance inflation factors (VIF) well
under the suggested value of 10 with the mean VIF of 1.55
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and the highest value equal to 2.11; thus, we do not have any
problems with multi-collinearity.
There is a strong negative correlation between board of
director tenure and subprime specialist as well as board gender
diversity and subprime specialist. In addition, we find a strong
positive correlation between outside director busyness and
subprime specialist.
Univariate Analysis
In Table 3, the sample was divided into subprime and prime
firms and t-tests were run to provide a univariate analysis of
differences in means for the key variables in the study. First,
it is important to note that there is no statistical difference in
firm size as measured by total assets. As the matched pairs
were selected on total assets, there should be no difference in
firm size between the two samples. Significant differences
were found in the following variables – board tenure, outside
director busyness, board gender diversity, and firm age.
Subprime firms had boards of directors with significantly
less tenure than the control firms (t = 5.63, p < .001).
Subprime firms also had significantly busier boards
(t = -3.33, p < .001) and less board gender diversity (t = 1.82,
p < .10). Last, subprime firms were much younger than the
control firms (t = 3.33, p < .001).
Logistic Regression
The results of the panel data logistic regression with
subprime as the dependent variable can be found in Table 4.
Two models are built and tested in a hierarchical manner. In
Model 1, only control variables are used. In Model 2, the
three main effect variables are added; thus, comparing
Model 1 and Model 2, it can be demonstrated that the model
becomes robust. Furthermore, there are significant improve-
ments between Models 1 and 2 as indicated by changes in
the Chi-Square values and using a Chi-Square test of model
fit. In addition, likelihood ratio tests indicate a significant
improvement in model fit between Models 1 and 2.
H1 suggested that there would be a negative relationship
between board of director tenure and subprime lending. In
Model 2, the coefficient for board of director tenure is nega-
tive and significant, thus providing strong support for H1
(Model 2: b = -1.25, p < .000). Therefore, H1 is supported. H2
posited a positive relationship between outside director busy-
ness and subprime lending. The coefficient in Model 2 is posi-
tive and significant (Model 2: b = 1.65, p < .01). Thus, the
data supports H2. H3 stated that there would be a negative
relationship between board gender diversity and subprime
lending. Again, the coefficient for board gender diversity in
Model 2 is negative and significant (Model 2: b = -12.94,
p < .05). Therefore, H3 is supported. In summary, three
hypotheses that examined the influence of attributes con-
nected to group decision making processes of the board of
directors on subprime lending were introduced and empiri-
cally tested. Empirical support was found for all hypotheses.
In the next section, we will discuss the findings in greater
detail.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Given that subprime lending in the US played a significant
role in the global financial crisis, this study makes a contri-
bution by examining the role of corporate governance
among firms that specialized in subprime lending between
1997 and 2005. In retrospect, we now know that the decision
to be involved in subprime lending brought huge levels of
risk to firms. Using a unique dataset provided by HUD, we
created a matched pair sample of financial firms that special-
ized in subprime lending and those who did not and exam-
ined the differences in board configuration. We found that
board tenure and board gender diversity were negatively
TABLE 2

















Board Size 9.51 9.83 -.65
Staggered Board .61 .65 -.86
CEO Duality .74 .73 .22
CEO Ownership 12.61 13.94 -.58
CEO Tenure 9.05 7.79 1.37
Firm Age 52.99 34.84 3.33***
Firm Size 7.77 7.56 .67
Debt to Equity .03 .03 .78
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Subprime is a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 if the
firm is on the HUD Subprime Specialist List and 0 otherwise. Board
independence is the ratio of independent directors to total directors.
CEO duality is a dummy variable is created by coding 0 for sepa-
rated CEO and Chair roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chair role.
We define CEO ownership as the total number of shares held by the
CEO divided by the firm’s total number of outstanding shares.
Board of director tenure as the total number of years served on the
board by each director divided by the total number of directors.
Outside director busyness is measured as the average number of
director positions held by outside directors of the firm. Board gender
diversity is the proportion of women to total directors. Board size is
defined as the total number of members that are on the board of
directors. Staggered board is a dummy variable which takes the value
of 1 if the firm’s entire board is not up for re-election at the same
time and 0 if it is a unitary board with all members standing for
election each year. CEO tenure is the total number of years that
person has been in the CEO role. Firm age is calculated by the total
number of years since incorporation and is calculated by the dif-
ference between the subprime year and the firm’s year of incorpo-
ration lagged one year. Firm size is measured by the book value of
total assets. Debt-to-equity is defined as total debt divided by total
assets.
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related to the decision to specialize in subprime lending
while outside director board busyness was positively related
to the decision. These results support our group decision
making perspective predictions.
The results of our study add to the body of literature
suggesting that characteristics of board members are impor-
tant. Our finding that board tenure is negatively related to
subprime lending adds support to research that has found
younger boards may be too inexperienced to be effective
(Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Dunn, 2004). We discov-
ered a positive and significant relationship between board
busyness and subprime lending which adds to work done in
this area, by supporting the notion that busy boards may not
be the most effective boards when it comes to overseeing
risky strategic initiatives (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Jackling
& Johl, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2009). Our evidence that board
gender diversity negatively impacts the decision to special-
ize in subprime lending not only contributes to governance
research but makes a contribution to the diversity research
stream. The greater the percentage of women on the board,
the less likely a firm was to specialize in subprime lending.
Our findings suggest that board gender diversity can have
differential and positive impacts on firm operations, possi-
bly by providing firm decision-makers with a wider range of
view-points and alternative modes of decision-making, par-
ticularly when risky strategic decisions are being evaluated.
Despite the significant findings, there are some limitations
to this study. First, while we relied on a unique dataset from
HUD of firms specializing in subprime lending, we had
difficulty finding financial data for a number of the listed
firms. A large portion of the firms in the HUD dataset were
privately owned. Furthermore, it would have been better to
have more exact information about the level of subprime
lending as a proportion of their overall business. Further
studies may be able to utilize a dataset with more extensive
data on the level of subprime lending. In addition, some of
TABLE 4
Panel Binary Logistic Regression (Dependent Variable: Subprime Lending)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Beta Std. Err. Beta Std. Err.
Constant -3.96 8.84 -1.1 3.56
Controls
Board Independence 4.21 11.72 1.25 4.86
Board Size .24 .49 .33 .21
Staggered Board -2.56 3.75 1.44 1.70
CEO Duality -1.98 4.54 .15 1.86
CEO Ownership .03 .07 .06 .05
Firm Age .01 .04 -.02 .01
Firm Size .00 .00 .11 .11
Debt to Equity .00 .00 .00 .00
Direct Effects




Board Gender Diversity -12.94 7.42*
Model c2 5.44 (8 df) 74.48 (11 df)
D c2 69.04***
Sample size N = 277 N = 275
Log likelihood -27.79 -37.47
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Subprime is a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 if the firm is on the HUD Subprime Specialist List and 0 otherwise. Board size
is defined as the total number of members that are on the board of directors. Board independence is the ratio of independent directors to
total directors. Staggered board is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s entire board is not up for re-election at the same
time and 0 if it is a unitary board with all members standing for election each year. CEO duality is a dummy variable is created by coding
0 for separated CEO and Chair roles, and 1 for a combined CEO/chair role. We define CEO ownership as the total number of shares held
by the CEO divided by the firm’s total number of outstanding shares. CEO tenure is the total number of years that person has been in the
CEO role. Firm age is calculated by the total number of years since incorporation and is calculated by the difference between the subprime
year and the firm’s year of incorporation and lagged one year. Firm size is measured by the book value of total assets. Debt-to-equity is
defined as total debt divided by total assets. Board of director tenure as the total number of years served on the board by each director
divided by the total number of directors. Outside director busyness is measured as the average number of director positions held by outside
directors of the firm. Board gender diversity is the proportion of women to total directors.
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our control firms may have been involved in subprime
lending, but to a lesser extent than the 50 per cent cut-off set
by HUD.
Our second limitation is our reliance on archival data. The
study of corporate governance is in desperate need of addi-
tional studies that provide insight on the “black box” of
board decision making. Further studies may be able to
uncover richer insights on how boards interact with top
management to monitor and provide strategic insight in the
context of strategic decision making.
Finally, our study was US-centric because the subprime
banking crisis originated there. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
and Aguilera and Jackson (2003) suggest that governance
environments differ between countries. It would be interest-
ing to examine the role of the board of directors in subprime
lending across different governance environments as there
has been sparse research comparing the subprime lending
intensity across different governance environments.
Theoretical, Managerial and Policy Implications
There are theoretical, managerial, and policy implications of
this research. This study makes a contribution to the litera-
ture as the group decision making perspective was success-
ful in predicting whether a firm engaged in risky subprime
lending. It also suggests that the board of director configu-
ration can influence board decision making in the firm.
For managers and shareholders, this study finds that
board configuration is an important determinant of good
decision making. Firms need to be aware of the extra chal-
lenges that boards face as a group that only meets sporadi-
cally (Monks & Minow, 1995). Thus, group decision making
problems such as herding, group think, and pluralistic igno-
rance can easily be exacerbated. Firms need to pay closer
attention to board tenure and make sure that the board
remains balanced with respect to board experience with the
focal firm. Special attention may be needed for younger
board members to encourage them to speak out and actively
engage in strategic decisions. Creating a climate where cog-
nitive conflict or the asking of tough but productive ques-
tions should be encouraged. Furthermore, the findings
suggest that busy boards can be problematic. While busy
boards can provide extensive external networks for compa-
nies, board members may be too consumed with matters
related to multiple firms to have the time and energy to
provide the type of effort needed to add value at the focal
firm. Board nominating committees should carefully balance
experience with how over-committed a director may
become, when selecting potential board members. Finally,
we clearly demonstrate that board gender diversity adds
value to a board. For enhanced decision making processes,
firms would be advised to continue to strive to add diversity
to board rooms. Finally, consistent with our findings, Atkin-
son and Atkinson (2006) offer three recommendations to
improve board decision making. First, they suggest that
“chairs could attempt to engender both task and relation
oriented atmospheres in the boardroom” (Atkinson & Atkin-
son, 2006:26) so that key decisions are more thoroughly dis-
cussed. Second, they recommend speaking rituals whereby
all members are routinely asked for input on decisions.
Third, board members are encouraged to be recognized for
their efforts. Implementation of these suggested activities
may mitigate some of the negative influences and enhance
the positive ones we found in our study.
For policymakers, the study provides evidence about the
important role of corporate governance and possible direc-
tions for future regulation (Kranacher, 2008). Pattanaik
(2009:21) argues that increased regulation is necessary as
“free market forces had created a monster out of the under-
lying sub-prime loans through financial innovations, whose
potential for a global systemic meltdown was largely
ignored because of the growing perception among policy-
makers that free markets and globalization together had
succeeded in delivering a prolonged period of high growth
and low inflation for the world economy’ ” however, regu-
lation is not a simple task. John Carver), a noted governance
expert, states that, “governance theory will not be a ‘one size
fits all’ prescription as to structure and composition, but a
coherent framework of fundamental, global principles
upon which each board’s individual practices can be left to
vary in recognition of contextual and cultural particulars
(2010:150).”
To conclude, this study makes a significant contribution to
the literature and practice with regards to corporate gover-
nance and the global financial crisis. We are optimistic our
findings will generate additional research on these impor-
tant issues.
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